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INTERPRETATION OF LAW
GILBERT

Q EVERAL

E.

BRACH*

years ago in an address to the Racine County Bar Association I started by saying, "The spirit of unrest today is not confined primarily to economics and politics, but also to the subject which
is most vital to all of us, namely the law. Social problems created
by new social conditions due to the growth of industrial centers tax
our system of jurisprudence and it is not uncommon to hear the lawyer exclaim when working amidst the maze of decisions that are
ground out by the various courts, 'Where do we stand?'"
This may be said to be more true today, for as each year passes
we must accept new concepts of the law. There are some who will
read this paper who can look back and remember when there was a
reverence for the rules laid down by the courts, and when it was comparatively easy to tell a client, "This is the law," and the client could
complacently rely thereon. But today there is a vast difference.
There are those who adhere to the school of juristic thought,
that it is better that the law be fixed though it may work a hardship.
It is admitted that fast rules make harsh law, but it is contended that
this inures to the benefit of a sounder jurisprudence. This may be
summed up in the doctrine generally referred to as stare decisis.
On the other hand, there are those who believe that law has a definite
function to perform in our social and political structure, and the underlying duty of the court is to discover the law applicable to the
instant facts.
In our law schools the former doctrine is still taught and stressed,
if the ideas expressed by the recent graduates may be said to be a
criterion of the teaching. No doubt the instructor is placed in this
position, because under the case method of teaching, he relies upon
the decisions of the court to convey to the student mind certain principles in a given subject. Perhaps this is the correct rule to follow
with the student, but it does pave the way for some serious shocks
which trouble the student for some years to come. I shall refer to
this again later.
In order to appreciate the conclusion reached by our courts and
the juristic thought applied to the conclusion reached, it must be detepni6Ad 'whether justice shall be founded upon an express rule or
upon, a -right. If it is founded upon an express rule, justice is then
meted out. in .-accordance with legal values rather than in accordance
with sociaf ;alues.
*

Member of Racine Bar.
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The study of juristic thought resolves itself into the various schools
of jurisprudence. These are the Analytical, the Philosophical, the
Historical and the Sociological. One little realizes the part these
schools of juristic thought have played in the interpretation of law.
The thought expressed that the law is unchangeable and depends
upon the natural law which can be discovered by rational speculation
represents the Philosophical School of juristic thought. Each rule
of law therefore must stand the test of reasonableness. It gave an
opportunity for fine distinctions and is the foundation for the axiom,
what would a reasonable man do under the same or similar circumstances ?
Wherever the law is made to conform to a concept based upon a
legal axiom, there is little opportunity for progress in the law. It
lags in its function to find justice, or as is commonly called, the equities, for it is based strictly upon legal values.
There is also the school of juristic thought that desires to measure the past in the light of the present, rather than to measure the
present in the light of the past. This makes for a rigidity in the law,
convenient perhaps to the jurist, but usually lacking in social justice.
This may be termed the Historical School of juristic thought.
Can you not see the opportunity for the legal mind, trained in
technicalities, steeped in the history of the past, enjoying the pure
logic of a sylogistic conclusion? But what of the justice to the litigants? What of the equities of either? It always was and always
will be to some far more important that a principle be fixed than to
ultimately discover justice.
Law is a constant growth. It grows with changing conditions.
Economic conditions, political thought, new social environments all
stamp their indelible mark upon the law. In each case it is necessary
to discover the law. It is not a fixed principle, but depends rather
upon social justice and the inherent equities in each case. The student of the law should study it in the light of human achievement;
he should interpret it in the light of justice and the inherent equities
involved.
When Judge Winslow in Borgnis vs. Falk Co., 147 Wis. 327 held
constitutional the Workmen's Compensation law, he threw aside legal
axioms, cast aside the doctrine of stare decisis, and in the light of
human achievement and in the light of social justice said:
"It is a matter of common knowledge that this law forms the legislative response to an emphatic, if not a peremtory, public demand. It
was admitted by lawyers as well as laymen that the personal injury action brought by the employe against his employer to recover damages
for injuries sustained by reason of the negligence of the employer
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had wholly failed to meet or remedy a great economic and social
problem which modern industrialism has forced upon us, namely, the
problem of who shall make pecuniary recompense for the toll of suffering and death which that industrialism levies and must continue
to levy upon the civilized world. This problem is distinctly a modern
problem. In the days of manual labor, the small shop with few employes, and the stage-coach, there was no such problem, or if there
was it was almost negligible. Accidents there were in those days and
distressing ones, but they were relatively few, and the employe who
exercised any reasonable degree of care was comparatively secure
from injury. There was no army of injured and dying with constantly swelling ranks marching with halting step and dimming eyes
to the great hereafter. * * * To speak of the common-law personal
injury action as a remedy for this problem is to jest with serious subjects, to give a stone to one who asks for bread. The terrible economic waste, the overwhelming temptation to the commission of perjury, and the relatively small proportion of actions, condemn them
as wholly inadequate to meet the difficulty."
If an exhaustive study is made of the interpretation of the law
for social interests, it is easy enough to criticise, because of its weaknesses. What methodological guide has the lawyer or the judge? If
the lawyer cannot turn to the decided case and say to his client, "this
is the law, because the court passed upon this question," where does
he stand? If the doctrine of stare decisis is to be relegated (and
it appears to be), what becomes of the doctrine of persuasive and
imperative authority? One could with some assurance turn to a decided case and say, this is imperative authority, for the court has already passed upon this question, or, this is a good case because an
outside court has passed upon the question, and it is very strong
persuasive authority. But if the court is searching for the social
interest, if it is ferreting out the equities in the given case, one cannot be certain. This is one of the most difficult problems for all of
us to understand, and especially the young man who has been taught
some of the theories and the principles of the older school of juristic
thought. Where is the judge going to turn for guidance when searching for the social interests? He must call upon his philosophy, upon
his experience, and upon his knowledge in arriving at his conclusion.
He may even go to the special pamphlets and reports of committees
studying special questions for his authority, as did Judge Rosenberry
in the case of State ex rel. Hammann, et al. vs. Levitan, State Treasurer, et al., 200 Wis. 271, 228 N. W. 140, and for which he was
roundly criticised by many of the members of the Wisconsin Bar.
This case is a good example, however, of the problem that confronts
the student of the law, and especially if he fails to assume the attitude that law as a concept is for social justice.
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If law is in constant development and growth, then it would appear to be most necessary in studying the facts in a particular case
to endeavor to arrive at the probability in which the court will view
the case. It is necessary to determine where the social interest or
the equities in the case lie. To do this requires knowledge and experience which cannot be taken entirely from the books or from any
particular category of learning.
Judge Cardozo, who is one of the strongest adherents of the new
school of juristic thought says of this school in "The Nature of the
Judicial Process":
"If you ask how he is to know when one interest outweighs another, I can only answer that he must get his knowledge just as the
legislator gets it, from study, experience and reflection * * *.

He,

the judge, must balance all his ingredients, his philosophy, his logic,
his analysis, his history, his customs, his sense of right, and all the
rest, and adding a little here and taking out a little there, must determine as wisely as he can, which weight shall tip the scales. If this
seems a weak and inconclusive summary, I am not sure that the fault
is mine. I know that he is a wise pharmacist who from a recipe so
general can compound a fitting rernedy."
If the recipe as given by Judge Cardozo is the one that the judge
is to use in determining social justice, doesn't it seem as though the
duty of the lawyer to his client, in the light of such an interpretation of the law, is to determine as closely as he can from his experience and his knowledge what the probabilities of the law are, in the
eyes of the court, and the light in which the court will view his case?
I shall take the liberty of referring to several late Wisconsin
cases to illustrate the difficulty which a student of the law has in
determining the probability of the law by the court.
In the particular case quoted, Justice Owen wrote both decisions.
In State ex rel Harbach vs. City of Milwaukee, 189 Wis. 184, 206
N.W. 210, he said, speaking generally of education:
"If the field of legislation upon the subject of education belongs
to the state, it belongs to it in its entirety. If the cause of education is not a subject of municipal regulation, the municipality cannot
touch it or interfere with it in the slightest degree. School buildings are an essential agency in the state's educational scheme, and to
allow municipalities a voice in the construction, repair, control or
management of the school buildings within their borders is to yield to
them the power to frustrate the state's plan in promoting education
throughout the state. If power be granted to interfere in this respect,
there would be no logical remedy to municipal interference with the
district schools. This court has held that the ward schools of the
cities of the state are district schools within the meaning of Article
10 (3) of the Constitution."
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In the case of State ex rel Board of Education of Racine against
the City of Racine, the same judge speaks of education as follows:
"The board of education is dealing with a special subject. It is
necessary for it to visualize the future educational necessities of the
city and to plan to meet such necessities. On the other hand, the
common council is the fiscal authority of the city. It knows and understands the financial conditions of the city and the general municipal
problems imposing burdens upon the taxpayers. Exorbitant demands
of the board of education might very well make it impossible to carry
forward other municipal undertakings of the greatest importance.
There is sound policy in centralizing the taxing authority where a
proper balance and proportion may be fixed and maintained in the
matter of tax levies for all municipal purposes."
And quoting further in the decision, the judge refers to certain
statutes showing that the board of education is merely an arm of the
municipal government, he states:
"All of these provisions and
legislative purpose that school
function in cities, and that the
agency the same as the board of

others
affairs
board
public

might be cited to indicate the
shall constitute a municipal
of education is merely a city
works."

The reader should analyze both cases cited, because in the one
the court lays great stress upon the fact that education is a state function, whereas in the other, to sustain its conclusion, it says that the
board of education that administers the law relative to education is
an arm of the common council, the same as the board of public
works. It would seem that the court has paved the way for some
grave questions in these two decisions, but on the other hand, looking at this matter through the glasses of social interest, the first case
was written in December, 1925, and the second case was written in
May, 1931, and there was an entirely different atmosphere, economic
and political, when the second case was written. True, education
may still be a matter of the state, but if the common council is the
fiscal authority, then it would appear that the entire control and destiny of education is actually in the hands of the common council.
Thus it is difficult sometimes to appreciate the probability of the
law as the court is liable to express it.
This is not set forth in the spirit of criticism, because that is not
the function of this paper, but is merely set forth to illustrate one
of the difficulties that a student of the law has to contend with.
A criticism, however, of this school of juristic thought is the opportunity for expediency to slip into a prescription such as Judge
Cardozo has set forth, which will only tend to palliate temporarily
our social and economic ills.
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One can point now to cases in the respective states vhere expediency predominated because an agricultural or industrial interest was
at stake. Must the court rely upon the sociologist, the scientist-,"the'
agriculturist, the industrialist, the economist to draw its -conclusion
or will there be some ministry of justice, basing its decision uipon
the interpretation of all philosophy, science, industry, customs;lzih
fact everything that makes for a better understanding in. the-,.ela'
u
tions of our social and economic life?

*"

A second criticism of the sociological school of juristk tii16{l
raises the question, whether or not the voice of the Social Ci&fi t
infallible in determining what "is the justice accotding to lliv."
But in spite of the criticism of this school, the courti ari ii6 fe
and more turning to it in determining the social ind 'ecofidfniL ci& 4
tions that come before it.

'

"

With each session of the legislature trying to outdo the one gone
before in passing laws, the problem of the interpretation to be placed
upon them must of necessity require some time and thought. Many
of these laws must in time either stand or fall before the scrutiny of
the courts. Some of these laws deal with the municipalities and the
state, still others deal with crime and the regulation thereof; others
deal primarily with taxation; still others deal with the welfare of
the general populace. The courts in interpreting the law always
start out with the premise that the statute is amendatory of the common-law. No doubt this is the stumbling block in the interpretation
of many statutes. The statute is passed because the common-law has
ceased to supply a remedy, and still the court, if it follows the rule
of stare decisis, calls upon the common-law in its construction, and
so long as the human language remains an imperfect instrument,
and is subject to a variety of interpretations, then the legislative will
must be construed by the courts in order to determine the meaning.
The written law differs fundamentally from the customary or
common law in that it begins with an abstract rule. Why then can
the court not interpret this rule in the light of present and existing
conditions ?
With conditions as they are, the task of the lawyer becomes more
difficult each day. He cannot place a given set of facts within a rule
and positively inform his client that such is the law. What is true
of the negligence cases is becoming so in more branches of the law.
We have today in our jurisprudence some of the principles of the
Roman law, and some of the principles of the common-law. We are
still trying in many phases of the law to administer justice in a complex society by means of frontier principles. Perhaps a better understanding of the situation that we are confronted with will make
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us more careful in our scrutiny of those men who are to interpret the
law on the bench. The government that we have sworn to uphold
depends for its existence upon the administration of the law. The
lawyer is the agent who stands between chaos and orderly government. In order that he may better carry out his duty to a maximum
degree and in order that he may better appreciate his responsibility
he must always keep in mind that he is an administrator of law.
Perhaps this responsibility may be better fulfilled by adhering to
the old schools of juristic thought and the doctrine of stare decisis;
perhaps by breaking all fetters and setting forth on uncharted courses
to seek social justice. In either event, as ministers of justice, we
must not forget that the law must keep pace with the time. It must
grow in order to function, and in order to function, it must first of
all be understood by those who are to administer it.

